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We investigate the implications of product market imperfections on profit sharing, wage 
negotiation and equilibrium unemployment. The optimal profit share, which the firms use as a 
wage-moderating commitment device, is below the bargaining power of the trade union. 
Intensified product market competition decreases profit sharing, but increases the negotiated 
base wage, because the wage-increasing effect of reduced profit sharing dominates the wage-
reducing effect associated with a higher wage elasticity of labor demand. Finally, we show 
that intensified product market competition does not necessarily reduce equilibrium 
unemployment, because it induces both higher wage mark-ups and lower optimal profit 
shares. 
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I.  Introduction 
According to standard wisdom of economics competition promotes economic 
efficiency. In line with this general view intensified competition in product markets 
could be expected to promote employment. However, with labor market imperfections 
the effects of intensified product market competition on unemployment are far from 
self-evident.  
In the present study we explore the impact of intensified product market 
competition in the presence of profit sharing on price setting, wage formation and 
equilibrium unemployment.  We show the following results. The optimal profit share, 
to which firms commit themselves prior to the wage negotiation, is smaller than the 
bargaining power of the trade union unlike existing results in the current literature and 
more consistent with empirics.  Intensified product market competition decreases 
optimal profit sharing, but it will have a positive effect on the negotiated base wage. 
Intensified product market competition increases the negotiated base wage, because the 
wage-enhancing effect of the reduced profit shares dominates relative to the wage-
moderating effect associated with higher wage elasticity of labor demand. For that 
reason intensified product market competition does not necessarily reduce equilibrium 
unemployment, because it induces a higher base wage mark-up through a lower optimal 
profit share.  
In light of the arguments developed above, reduced distortions in the product 
market do not necessarily improve the performance of the labor market, which suffers 
from a primary distortion with its roots in the bargaining power of the trade union. 
However, when firms commit to optimal profit sharing, intensified product market 
competition will indeed decrease equilibrium unemployment in the case of a monopoly 
trade union, while it has no effect on equilibrium unemployment when the trade union 
has no bargaining power. Finally, in the absence of profit sharing, intensified product 
market competition  will always decrease the equilibrium unemployment by 
unambiguously decreasing the distortionary wage mark-up in the labor market. Thus, 
the performance-based remuneration system in the form of profit sharing seems to play 
an important role for the relationship between imperfections in product and labor 
markets. Overall, we characterize in detailed simulations those circumstances where 
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intensified product market competition, in the presence of profit sharing, hurts 
employment. 
Some employment consequences of intensified competition and deregulation in 
product markets have been analyzed in the recent literature.  Next we briefly 
characterize these. Nickell (1999) has surveyed how market power in the product 
markets impacts on the performance of the labor market by reviewing collective 
bargaining models and efficiency wage models for the wage determination. There is 
some evidence that sharing of monopoly rents leads to higher wages in the presence 
market power in the product markets, but it is not clear whether this is essentially a 
union effect or applies equally well in the non-union sector. Gersbach (2000) 
summarizes three mechanisms, through which reductions in product market 
imperfections might enhance employment and concludes that product market reforms 
in Europe could imply employment gains. These mechanisms are based on lower mark-
ups, higher total productivity and expanded sets of product varieties (see also Gersbach 
and Schniewind 2001).  
Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) and Spector (2004) have developed a 
monopolistic competition model with collective wage bargaining, but not profit 
sharing, to study the effects of product market competition under imperfectly 
competitive labor markets and argued that higher product market competition will 
increase employment. Ebell and Haefke (2003) have studied the relationship between 
product market structure and labor market outcomes by focusing on Mortensen-
Pissarides-type search and matching frictions and monopolistic competition in the 
product markets when there is individual wage bargaining. Their qualitative findings 
are roughly similar to those of Blachard and Giavazzi (2003) and Spector (2004). 
Amable and Gatti (2004) have developed a different type of framework. They use a 
model of monopolistic competition with an endogenous determination of worker flows 
in and out of employment where wages are determined, not by bargaining, but by an 
efficiency wage mechanism and they show that higher product market competition may 
generate employment losses rather than gains. 
Bayomi, Laxton and Presenti (2004) have applied a general equilibrium model of 
the global economy to examine the benefits from greater competition in product and 
labor markets on output, consumption and the stability of the economy. They estimate 
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the macroeconomic benefits and international spillovers of intensified competition in 
the product and labor markets and conclude that greater competition significantly 
stimulates macroeconomic performance and that it may improve macroeconomic 
management by increasing the responsiveness of wages and prices to market 
conditions. However, they do not model labor markets explicitly. Abowd and Lemieux 
(1993) has studied how product market conditions affect wages through their effects on 
the financial strength of the firm by using data from collective agreements in Canada 
and they show that higher foreign competition reduces wages. Nickell, Vainiomaki and 
Wadhwani (1994) and Konings and Walsh (2000) have also empirically explored some 
aspects of the employment effects of product market imperfections with imperfectly 
competitive labor markets. Using British firm level data Nickell, Vainiomaki and 
Wadhwani (1994) argue that product market power raises wages, while Konings and 
Walsh (2000) indicate that the impact of stronger product market competition on 
employment loss is lower in unionised firms compared with non-unionised firms.    
  It seems timely to investigate the effects of stronger product market competition 
on employment in light of the steady trend towards more intense product market 
competition in the OECD countries, and, in particular, in Europe. Conway, Janod and 
Nicoletti (2005) have in great detail  delineated recent trends of product market 
deregulation, and intensified competition, in OECD countries by using indicators of 
product market regulation. Clearly, regulatory impediments to product market 
competition have declined significantly in all OECD countries in recent years. For the 
group of EU member countries product market regulation is typically more 
homogenous, at least when evaluated year 2003, than in the rest of OECD.
1 
Furthermore, European competition policy in combination with improvements in the 
implementation of competition law has promoted product market competition by 
making it more difficult for firms to abuse dominant market positions. 
         The entire literature mentioned above, no matter whether theoretically oriented or 
empirically oriented, has abstracted from profit sharing as part of the compensation 
                                                 
1   Countries that were estimated to be relatively liberal in 1998 – the United Kingdom, the Unites 
States, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Ireland and Denmark – have reported relatively small 
degrees of relaxation in product market regulation. Countries estimated to be in the middle in 
terms of regulation indicator in 1998 are Iceland, the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, Germany, 
Austria, Japan, Belgium, Finland, Switzerland and Portugal. All of these countries have made 
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scheme in the labor market. However, profit sharing is an empirically important 
phenomenon in many OECD countries and our model predicts that it plays a significant 
role for the theoretical relationship between the imperfections in product markets and 
equilibrium unemployment with imperfectly competitive labor markets. The OECD 
Employment Outlook (1995) reports general cross-country evidence on the incidence of 
profit sharing in OECD countries. Pendleton et. al. (2001) presents more recent and 
detailed data on the significant proportion of workplaces with financial employee 
participation, in particular in the form of profit sharing schemes, in 14 EU countries. 
This information is illustrated in Figure 1. For example, among EU-countries in 
1999/2000 a double-digit percentage of the workplaces apply profit sharing in Austria, 
Finland, France, Germany Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United 
Kingdom. In some countries with particularly extensive profit sharing systems, like 
France, public policy explicitly encourages profit sharing. For further evidence 
regarding the incidence of profit sharing we refer to, for example, the DICE database 
collected by CESifo (http://www.CESifo.de), Wadhwani and Wall (1990), Cahuc and 























Figure 1: Workplaces with Profit Sharing in Percent, 1999/2000
 
Source: Pendleton, A., Poutsma, E., van Ommeren, J., Brewster, C., Employee Profit Sharing in the                 
European Union, European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working   
Conditions, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 2001. 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
progress in reducing the extent of state control, while reductions in barriers to entrepreneurship 
have been more disparate across these countries.    
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  Our study proceeds as follows. Section II presents the basic structure of the 
model as well as the time sequence of decisions with product and labor market 
imperfections. Price setting and labor demand by firms are studied in section III.  In 
section IV we analyze the wage determination using the Nash bargaining approach 
subject to price setting and labor demand. Section V explores the determination of 
optimal profit sharing, to which firms commit themselves prior to the wage 
determination. In section VI we characterize the determinants of the equilibrium 
unemployment with a particular emphasis on how it depends on the intensity of product 
market competition. Finally, in section VII we present concluding comments. 
 
II. Basic  Framework   
We focus on a deterministic model under product and labor market imperfections 
with the following time sequence of decisions. In the long run, at stage 1, the firms 
commit themselves to a profit-sharing arrangement, which specifies to what extent the 
wage contracts are performance-related. The profit share,τ , determines what fraction 
of the firms’ profits will be transferred to employed workers. The profit sharing 
decision is made in anticipation of its effects on the negotiated base wage as well as on 
price setting and labor demand. At stage 2 firms and labor unions bargain with respect 
to the base wage and this negotiation takes place under conditions where the firms are 
committed to the profit sharing contracts. The wage negotiations take place in 
anticipation of the consequences for labor demand and price setting. Finally, at stage 3 
firms make employment decisions and set product prices in the monopolistic 
competition by taking the profit sharing and the negotiated base wage as given.  
We summarize the time sequence of decisions in Figure 1. In the subsequent 
sections we derive the decisions taking place at different stages by using backward 
induction. 
This timing structure captures the idea that the profit sharing decisions take place 
within the framework of an institutional environment where the profit-sharing schemes 
have to be independent of the wage agreements. This timing structure seems to be a 
reasonably accurate description of how profit-sharing arrangements operate in many 
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countries
2 (see, for example, Cahuc and Dormont (1997) and Pendleton et. al. (2001)). 
Of course, the relative timing between the negotiated wage setting and the profit-
sharing decision could also be reversed so as to capture the case where the negotiated 




           Stage 1            Stage 2            Stage 3 
                                                           time 
    
      profit sharing           wage    labor  demand 
                   bargaining    price setting 
                            Figure 2: Time sequence of decisions 
We postulate (for each firm i) a Cobb-Douglas production function according to 
α
α L
L R i i = ) (,   i = 1,…,n                                                                                 (1) 
where   denotes the amount of labor (i.e. employment), and   is a parameter 
satisfying 0 < a < 1. Thus, (1) is a well-defined production function exhibiting 
decreasing returns to scale with respect to employment. 
i L a
 
III.  Price Setting and Labor Demand 
In this paper the product market is modeled to operate with monopolistic 
competition in line with Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). The firms face consumers endowed 
with the CES - utility function 
                                                 
2     For example, in France, where the reported proportion of workplaces with profit sharing exceeds 
50 %, firms can qualify for tax exemptions if they apply profit sharing schemes, which stipulate 
bonuses which are independent of the negotiated base wage.  
3       Koskela and Stenbacka (2005) have explored the impact of different time sequences between 
profit sharing decisions and base wage negotiations in a different model, which did not investigate 
the role of imperfections in the product market. 
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s ,             (2) 
where   denotes the elasticity of substitution between products and where n is the 
number of products (and firms). We assume that this elasticity of substitution measures 
the degree of product market competition.
1 > s
4 A higher elasticity of substitution means a 
higher degree of product market competition. In particular, the limiting case of perfect 
competition is associated with the elasticity of substitution   approaching infinity.   s
Firm i decides on price and employment so as to maximize the following profit 
function 
{ [ ] i i i i i i i i
i L i p
L w L R p − − = − ) ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( max
) , (
τ π τ   .                           (3) 
At this stage the firm takes the negotiated wage rate   and the profit share  i w i τ  as given. 
From the underlying utility function, given by (2), the demand in the product market 
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 is the index of the aggregate price 
level, M  is the aggregate nominal income. Thus, M/P denotes the real income.
5   
By imposing market-clearing in the product markets,  i i R D = , we can re-






































M L w D p
i
                              (5) 
                                                 
4     Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) have analyzed the case, where s  is determined through a process 
of free entry so that  s  is endogenous in the long run. The utility function (2) has the special 
feature that an increase in the number of products does not increase utility directly (for more 
discussion in this respect, see Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), p. 882). In our framework the 
number of firms is assumed to be fixed. 
  7 
where   and   are taken as given. The necessary first-order condition associated 
with (5) can be expressed as 
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By imposing the symmetry condition  P pi =  for all i, (6) can be simplified according 
to the following price-setting rule 
α
α
α α α i i w
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1 1    for all i,                           (7) 
where the mark-up factor,  ) 1 /( ) ( − = s s s µ , associated with the pricing equilibrium, 
depends negatively on the elasticity of substitution between products, i.e. on the higher 
product market competition.  
From (7) we can derive the following qualitative properties to the price setting: 
















i .                      (8) 
These findings are summarized in 
Proposition 1 Higher wage rates and higher income will raise the equilibrium price in 
the product market, while higher product market competition will decrease the price.  
We next study labor demand with a particular emphasis on the effects of 
product market  competition. The  necessary first-order condition determining labor 
demand can be written as  
0 = − =
∂
∂






   ,                       (9) 
implying that the labor demand can be expressed as 
                                                                                                                                                 
5       A formal standard proof is available upon request. 








i i i w p L   .                                 (10) 
It should be emphasized that (10) is an implicit formulation of the labor demand, 
because  is endogenous and determined by (7). For the subsequent analysis we focus 
on a symmetric configuration with a representative firm and leave out the firm-specific 
index. 
i p
The wage elasticity of labor demand, which turns out to be important later on, 





) 1 ( s
s
L
w Lw   .                            (11) 
From (11) we can conclude that the wage elasticity of labor demand is determined by 
two parameters: the concavity of the production function (α ) and the degree of 
competition in the product markets ( ). We observe that intensified product market 
competition, measured by higher elasticity of substitution between the products, 
increases the wage elasticity of labor demand. Namely, formally we find that   
s
0








s    .                                        (12) 
Intuitively, intensified product market competition makes it harder for the firms to 
survive with higher wages and thus increased competition makes the firms’ 
employment decisions more sensitive to changes in the wage rate. It is important to 
emphasize that there is no direct effect of profit sharing on the wage elasticity. This is 
because profit sharing operates like a non-distortionary profit tax and, therefore, does 
not affect labor demand (see (3)). 
We can summarize this in 
Proposition 2  Intensified product market competition will increase the wage elasticity 
of labor demand.  
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IV.  Wage Negotiation   
We now turn to analyze the stage where the base wage is determined under 
circumstances where the profit share τ  is given. We apply the Nash bargaining solution 
within the context of the ‘right-to-manage’ approach according to which employment is 
unilaterally determined by the firms. The wage bargaining takes place in anticipation of 
the optimal price and employment decisions by the firms.  
   We write the linear utilitarian objective function of the trade union as  
        [] b L N L w L w U ) ( ) ( ) ( ˆ * * * * − + + = π τ ,                  (13) 
where the first term captures the rent to the employed and the second term that to the 
unemployed union members and where   denotes the indirect profit function. The 
parameter   captures the exogenous outside option. We denote the relative bargaining 
power of the union by 
* π
b
β , and that of the firm by  ) 1 ( β − , and assume that the threat 
points of the trade union and the firm are described by   and  , 
respectively. Applying the Nash bargaining solution the negotiating parties decide on 
the base wage   in order to solve  
Nb U
o = 0 =
o π
w
       s.t.   { [] []
β β π τ
− − = Ω
1 *
) (
) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( w w U w Max
w
0 = = L p π π                                       (14) 
 where  [
* * * ) ( ) ( ˆ π τ L b w L U U U
o + − = − = ]  is the bargaining surplus to the union. 
As shown in detail in Appendix B the indirect profit can be expressed as  



















) 1 (.                           (15) 
The Nash bargaining solution satisfies the following first-order condition 









 .                               (16) 
As shown in Appendix C, we can explicitly solve the first-order condition (16) to find 
the following Nash bargaining solution    
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α β α τ η β
α β α η β
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ) 1 ( (
) 1 ( ) 1 (
− + − + −
− + −
=    .               (17) 
According to (17) the negotiated wage rate is proportional to the outside option 
( ) and the proportionality factor delineates the mark-up incorporated in the negotiated 
wage. As usual, this wage mark-up depends positively on the relative bargaining power 
of the trade union (
b
β ).  Moreover, we can directly observe that an increased profit 
share (τ ) will have a wage-moderating effect. Thus, under the specified time sequence 
of decisions, profit sharing serves as a strategic commitment device, which will affect 
the distribution of the rents achieved through wage bargaining.  
In the absence of profit sharing, differentiating (17) with respect to the index   of 






















   ,                              (18) 
where    Hence, in the absence of profit sharing intensified 
product market competition will moderate wage formation, ceteris paribus. This lies in 
conformity with empirical evidence,  according to which higher product market 
competition will moderate wage formation when profit sharing is not taken into 
account. Nickell (1999) presents a survey of this literature, which includes, for 
example, Abowd and Lemieux (1993) (Canadian data), Nickell, Vainiomäki and 
Wadhwani (1994) (British manufacturing data) and Neven, Röller and Zhang (1999) 
(data from eight European airline companies) to analyze links between product market 
competition and union power.  
[] . 0 ) 1 (
2 > + − =
− α α α η s s
         Finally, in the presence of profit sharing straightforward calculations demonstrate 
that  







) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ) 1 ( (
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α β α τ η β
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  .             (19) 
 
Consequently, we can conclude that the difference between the profit share and the 
bargaining power of the trade union is a crucial determinant of how an increase in the 
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wage elasticity of labor demand (η) impacts on the negotiated wage rate in the 
presence of profit sharing. We summarize our characterization of the negotiated base 
wage in 
 
Proposition 3  The negotiated base wage is proportional to the outside option. The 
wage mark-up is decreasing as a function of the profit share. Also in the presence of 
profit sharing it is decreasing as a function of the wage elasticity of labor demand if 
and only if the profit share is smaller than the relative bargaining power of the trade 
union, while in the absence of profit sharing the wage mark-up is a decreasing function 
of the wage elasticity of labor demand. 
 
In terms of empirics, it seems reasonable that the relative bargaining power of 
the trade union would exceed the adopted profit shares meaning that there would be a 
negative relationship between the wage elasticity of labor demand and the negotiated 
base wage. In the next section we show that this also holds true in our theoretical 
framework when firms decide on profit sharing in an optimal way. Furthermore, from 
(17) we can conclude that the intensity of competition in the product market has no 
direct effect on the negotiated base wage. However, the intensity of competition in the 
product market affects the negotiated wage through two indirect mechanisms, namely 
via the profit share and the wage elasticity of labor demand. The wage elasticity of 
labor demand will increase as a result of intensified product market competition (see 
(12)). We evaluate the relationship between optimal profit sharing and product market 
competition in section V. This will make it possible to offer a complete characterization 
of the relationship between the intensity of product market competition and the 
negotiated base wage in the presence of optimal profit sharing. 
The Nash bargaining solution (17) implies a number of interesting special cases. 
If all the bargaining power lies with the union ( 1 = β ), the Nash bargaining solution is 
simplified to the monopoly union solution
6
                                                 
6   This special case has been earlier presented by Jackman (1988) in the case of imperfect product 
market competition. 







= 1 1     .               (20a) 
If, on the other hand, all the bargaining power is concentrated in the hands of the firm, 
(17) will reduce to   
     b w
M




=  ,                  (20b) 
Both the special cases (20a) and (20b) highlight the wage-moderating effects of profit 
sharing. In particular, with no bargaining power for the trade union, (20b) shows that 
introduction of profit sharing makes it possible to reduce the base wage of the workers 
even below the exogenous outside option. 
 
V.  Determination of Committed Profit Sharing 
 
           We now proceed to analyze the firm’s optimal commitment to the compensation 
structure in the form of a profit share. As we have demonstrated in the previous section, 
the profit share will subsequently impact on the negotiated base wage and thereby on 
























s.t.  0 = = = Ω p L w π π  .        (21) 
 
            The first-order optimality condition is  











 .                                                 (22) 
                                                 
7       A number of contributions to the literature on wage bargaining, for example, Anderson and 
Devereux (1989), Pohjola (1987), Holmlund (1991) and  Jerger and Michaelis (1999) have 
analyzed profit sharing within a framework where the union-firm negotiations include profit 
shares in addition to base wages. All of these studies abstract from product market imperfections, 
which is the novel and central feature in our analysis.  
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N N w w
. By substituting this into (23) 
we can explicitly solve for the optimal profit share. Executing this operation we find 
that the optimal profit share is given by 
 









   .                                                                 (24) 
 
    According to (24) the optimal profit share increases with the relative bargaining 
power of the trade union, because the induced base wage moderation stimulates the 
firm’s use of profit sharing. Further, we can infer that the optimal profit share is always 
below the bargaining power of the trade union, i.e.  . β τ <
* 8  Finally, from (24) we can 
conclude that intensified product market competition reduces the firm’s incentives to 
use profit sharing. We summarize our findings in  
 
Proposition 4 The optimal profit share is increasing as a function of the relative 
bargaining power of the trade union, but it is always below this bargaining power. 
Further, intensified competition in the product market decreases the optimal profit 
share.  
 
                                                 
8      Holmlund (1991) analyzed profit sharing in the absence of product market imperfections and 
within a framework of simultaneous negotiations with respect to both the base wage and the profit 
share. In such a framework he showed that the negotiated profit share is equal to the relative 
bargaining power of the trade union. Clearly, when firms commit themselves to profit sharing the 
optimal profit share (24) is below the trade union’s bargaining power. Furthermore, the difference 
between the trade union’s bargaining power and (24) is larger the more competitive are the 
product markets. This is a new finding as well. Sorensen (1992) used a unionized duopoly model 
to ask when it is optimal for firms to introduce profit sharing as part of the compensation system. 
He argued that a profit-sharing system is established by both firms in a Nash equilibrium if both 
trade unions have limited bargaining power. 
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From (24) we can extract two interesting special cases. First, in the absence of 
product market imperfections, i.e. when  ∞ → s , the optimal profit share approaches 
zero. In other words, with perfect competition in the product market the firm would 
have no incentives to introduce profit sharing. This is because with perfect competition 
in the product market the wage elasticity of labor demand is very high and thereby 
wage moderation can be achieved without introducing the profit sharing. Second, in the 
absence of labor market imperfections, i.e. when  0 = β , the optimal profit share is 
zero. Thus, we can formulate the following  
 
Corollary 1    In the absence of product market imperfections ( ∞ → s ) or labor 
market imperfections ( 0 = β ) the optimal profit share is zero. 
 
Now, after having characterized the optimal profit share we can analyze the 
impact of intensified product market competition on the negotiated base wage. 
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                                                                                                                                   (25)                                  
According to (25), intensified product market competition will have a twofold effect on 
the negotiated wage: (1) a positive effect on the wage elasticity of labor demand 
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  .               (26) 
 
Hence we report the following new finding 
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Proposition 5  When the firms commit themselves to an optimal system of profit 
sharing, intensified product market competition will increase the negotiated wage rate. 
 
The interpretation of Proposition 5 goes as follows. Intensified product market 
competition will both (i) increase wage elasticity of labor demand and (ii) decrease the 
firm’s optimal profit share. The higher wage elasticity moderates the negotiated base 
wage, while the lower profit share will have an offsetting effect and, in fact, the latter 
effect will dominate. To the best of our knowledge this question about the relationship 
between the intensity of product market competition and the base wage formation in the 
presence of profit sharing has not been studied empirically.  
 
 VI.  Equilibrium Unemployment, Product Market Competition and 
Profit Sharing  
  
So far we have studied the formation of the negotiated base wage and the 
optimal profit share with a particular emphasis on how intensified product market 
competition affects these. We now integrate these elements in order to explore the 
consequences of imperfections in the labor and product markets for total employment 
in a general equilibrium context, where the labor force is mobile across industries.  
According to (17) for each industry the negotiated wage has the form 
 
    ,                       (27)  b w i
N
i Α =
where the mark-up  factor 
α β α τ β η β
α β α η β
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) (
) 1 ( ) 1 (
− + − + −
− + −
= i A is, in principle, 
industry-specific. We assume that all industries are identical so that so that the mark-
ups are . In a general equilibrium context with labor mobility across identical 
industries, which all apply profit sharing, the outside option  is now, in line with, for 


















,                  (28) 
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where   denotes the unemployment rate,  u B  denotes the unemployment benefit, τ  is 
the profit share and  is the negotiated wage rate in all the identical industries.
N w
9 Thus, 
the economy-wide base wage, the rate of profit sharing and the unemployment benefit 
constitute those components of the outside option, which are relevant for the wage 
negotiation.  
From (28) we can immediately infer that intensified product market competition 
will impact on the outside option available to the trade union in a general equilibrium 
context through several mechanisms. In the subsequent analysis we will be able to 
compare these various opposite effects and thereby to evaluate the overall employment 
consequences of intensified product market competition. 
   In line with the literature we restrict ourselves to a constant benefit-replacement 
ratio  . Combining (27) and (28) the equilibrium unemployment,  , can be 
solved from the equation  
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where we can calculate that 
α






N  . Substituting (24) into this equation 
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    .                                                             (29) 
According to (29) the equilibrium unemployment  depends positively both on 




1 > A ).
10 This mark-up is a positive function of the relative bargaining power of the 
trade union (β ) and a negative function on the profit share (τ ).  
Differentiating (29) with respect to the relative bargaining power of the trade 
union, β , gives  
                                                 
9       For a standard justification of this interpretation, see Layard et. al (1991) and  Nickell and 
Layard (1999).  





< , which we assume  to 
hold throughout the analysis. 



















































  ,                        (30)      
where  and  . Thus, equilibrium unemployment is always an increasing 
function of the relative bargaining power of the trade union, because the bargaining 
power has positive effects on both the profit share and on the wage mark-up in labor 
market.  
0
* > β τ 0 > β A
Differentiating (29) with respect to  , which captures the index of product 
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 According to (31) two offsetting 
mechanisms are important when evaluating the overall effects of intensified product 
market competition on equilibrium unemployment. On the one hand, stronger product 
market competition will decrease the optimal profit share and thereby reduce 
unemployment (the term  ) 0 )
1
(







. But on the other hand, stronger product 
market competition will also increase the mark-up in the labor market, which will raise 











 We summarize these 
observations in  
 
Proposition 6  Equilibrium unemployment is an increasing function of the relative 
bargaining power of the trade union. Intensified product market competition will have 
an ambiguous effect on equilibrium unemployment due to the negative effect on profit 
sharing and the positive effect on the wage mark-up.  
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From (31) we can deduce a number of interesting special cases. If all the 
bargaining power lies with the union ( 1 = β ), it holds that 0 = s A  by (26), whereas the 
optimal profit share is decreased  0 < s τ . On the other hand, if the union does not have 
any bargaining power ( 0 = β ), then according to (26)  0 = s A  and it also holds that 
. 0 = s τ  This can be summarized in  
 
Corollary 2 When the firms commit to optimal profit sharing, then intensified product 
market competition (i) decreases equilibrium unemployment in the case of a monopoly 
trade union, but (ii) it has no effect on equilibrium unemployment when the trade union 
has no bargaining power. 
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depends only on the relative bargaining power of the trade union and the wage 
elasticity of labor demand.  In this case we have the following relationship between 
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s A  .             (32) 
 
Thus we have  
 
Corollary 3 In the absence of profit sharing intensified competition in the product 
market will decrease equilibrium unemployment as it decreases the wage mark-up. 
 
According to Proposition 6 intensified product market competition will, in 
general, have an ambiguous effect on equilibrium unemployment in the presence of 
committed profit sharing when the trade union has an intermediate relative bargaining 
power ( 1 0 < < β ). From (31) we can generally conclude that the impact of intensified 
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product market competition on equilibrium unemployment is determined by the 
interplay between labor market institutions (captured byβ ), labor market policy 
(captured by the benefit-replacement ratio q) and the production technology (captured 
by the production function parameter α ).  These affect equilibrium unemployment 
through the wage elasticity of labor demand, wage mark-up, and profit sharing. In order 
to understand and open up this ambiguity  it is important to conduct numerical 
simulations in order to characterize those circumstances when intensified product 
market competition will decrease (increase) equilibrium unemployment.  
In Table 1 we characterize numerically how intensified product market 
competition, measured by  , affects (i) the wage elasticity of labor demand  s ) (η , (ii) the 
firm’s optimal profit share  ) (τ , (iii) the wage mark-up   and (iv) equilibrium 





) (α , the relative bargaining power of the trade union  ) (β  and the 
benefit-replacement ratio  .  ) (q
 
Fixed parameter values are α = 0.8, β = 0.3 and q = 0.4. 
s  η  τ A  u
N
2  1.667 0.200 1.031 0.124 
4  2.500 0.150 1.044 0.125 
8  3.333 0.100 1.056 0.124 
16  4.000 0.060 1.064 0.122 
32  4.444 0.033 1.069 0.120 
64  4.706 0.018 1.072 0.118 
128  4.848 0.009 1.073 0.117 
256  4.923 0.005 1.074 0.117 
512  4.961 0.002 1.075 0.117 
 
Table 1:    The  wage  elasticity,  optimal profit share, wage mark-up and 
equilibrium unemployment as a function of the intensity of product 
market competition.  
 
 
The simulations reported in Table 1 verifies that the wage elasticity of labor 
demand, the profit share and the wage mark-up are all strictly monotonic as a function 
of the intensity of product market competition as theoretically predicted by (12), (24) 
and  (26). Furthermore, the simulated values all tend to be fairly realistic from an 
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empirical point of view.
11 But interestingly, the equilibrium unemployment is not fully 
monotonic as a function of the intensity of product market competition. For a restricted 
segment with sufficiently strong product market imperfections the equilibrium 
unemployment is increasing as a function of the intensity of competition. However, 
under sufficiently weak product market imperfections increased competition will 
monotonically decrease unemployment.
12   
 
   
Figure 3: Equilibrium unemployment as a function of the intensity of product 
market competition under different levels of the relative bargaining 
power of the trade union (β ),  when  7 , 0 = α  and  . 4 , 0 = q  
 
                                                 
11   For example, the wage mark-up seems to be broadly in line with the empirical estimates presented 
by Blanchflower and Bryson (2002). 
12    The simulations displayed in Figure 3 also illustrate that reduced labor market imperfections 
(characterized by lower bargaining power of the trade union) might have a more significant impact 
on equilibrium unemployment than intensified product market competition. However, it is outside 
the scope to this paper to systematically investigate how important intensified product market 
competition is relative to labor market imperfections as an explanation of equilibrium 
unemployment. 
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  Figure 3 illustrates the significance of the labor market imperfection (β ) for the 
relationship between the intensity of product market competition and equilibrium 
unemployment. The qualitative nature  of this relationship is robust across different 
levels of the trade union’s bargaining power, but naturally a higher relative bargaining 
power of the trade union generates a significant shift towards higher levels of 
equilibrium unemployment. 
In light of Figure 3 we can ask: Under which combinations  ) , ( β s  does it hold 
true that the equilibrium unemployment  depends monotonically on the intensity of 
product market competition?  With sufficiently relaxed product market competition, 
intensified competition (higher  ) will increase the wage mark-up and decrease profit 
sharing with the former effect being stronger. However, the relative strength of these 
opposite effects will change with intensified product market competition.  Figure 4 
exhibits the location of those 
s
) , ( β s -combinations under which equilibrium 
unemployment is independent of the degree of product market competition when the 
parameter of the production function is  7 , 0 = α  and the benefit-replacement ratio is 
. For combinations below and to the left of this curve intensified product market 
competition will actually harm employment. As we can observe from Figure 4, this 
may happen for sufficiently strong product market imperfections, i.e. for sufficiently 
low values of  . Furthermore, higher relative bargaining power of the trade union shifts 
this threshold towards stronger product market imperfections. Conversely, the required 
value of   above which intensified product market competition promotes employment 
is decreasing as a function of 
4 , 0 = q
s
s
β . In this respect labor market and product market 
imperfections are complementary channels  in the creation of circumstances under 
which intensified product market competition harms employment.     
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Figure 4: Characterization of  ) , ( β s -combinations under which the equilibrium 
unemployment is independent of the intensity of product market 
competition when  7 , 0 = α  and  4 , 0 = q .  
 
             In Figure 5 we illustrate how the concavity of the production function 
impacts significantly on the region under which intensified product market competition 
hurts employment.  Namely, by increasing the parameter to  9 , 0 = α  so that the 
production function is less concave we observe that the region under which intensified 
product market competition hurts employment is significantly expanded. In particular, 
the location of the curve describing the  ) , ( β s -combinations under which the 
equilibrium unemployment is independent of the intensity of product market 
competition is significantly shifted to the right. 
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Figure 5: Characterization of  ) , ( β s -combinations under which the equilibrium 
unemployment is independent of the intensity of product market 
competition when  9 , 0 = α  and  4 , 0 = q .  
 
  In fact, as the production function approaches linearity the parameter 
combinations such that intensified product market competition hurts employment is 
expanded to capture a significant segment of the feasible  ) , ( β s -combinations. This 
feature is verified in Figure 6. 
  How can we intuitively explain why the parameter α  is important for the 
relationship between the intensity of product market competition and equilibrium 
unemployment? Within the general equilibrium framework the relevant outside option 
for the individual is given by (28), which can be rewritten as follows 





+ − q u u w
N )
1





This shows that the intensity of product market competition impacts on the outside 
option through two offsetting effects: (i) it moderates the equilibrium profit share, but 
(ii) it also increases the negotiated base wage. Formally, the impact of the intensity of 
product market competition on this outside option is determined by 













































 always dominates when α  is 
sufficiently close to 1.
13
 
Figure 6: Characterization of  ) , ( β s -combinations under which the equilibrium 
unemployment is independent of the intensity of product market 
competition when  99 , 0 = α  and  4 , 0 = q .  
 
  Finally, from the argument above we can also infer that a higher benefit-
replacement ratio  q  tends to make it more likely that intensified product market 
competition would hurt employment.  This feature is illustrated in Appendix D by 
Figures 7 and 8, which graphically explores the effects of intensified competition on 
equilibrium unemployment for an increase in the replacement ratio q.  
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VII.   Concluding Comments    
 
We have developed a framework with product and labor market imperfections 
and their interactions to study the effects of intensified product market competition on 
the optimal profit sharing, on the associated negotiated base wage and, importantly, on 
the equilibrium unemployment. The time sequence of decisions has been postulated as 
follows: First, in the long run firms have been assumed to commit themselves to profit 
sharing in anticipation of the negotiated base wage as well as price setting in the 
product markets and labor demand. Second, contingent on the profit sharing decision, 
firms and labor unions have been postulated to bargain about the base wage by using 
the ‘right-to-manage’ approach, anticipating its impacts on labor demand and price 
setting in the product markets. Finally, firms have been assumed to make employment 
and price setting decisions taking both the optimal profit sharing and the negotiated 
base wage as given. 
   We have obtained several new results. The optimal profit share, which the firms 
use as a wage-moderating commitment device, is smaller than the bargaining power of 
the trade union unlike in the current literature and more consistent with empirics. 
Intensified product market competition decreases the optimal profit shares. This holds 
true, because the wage-increasing effect of the reduced optimal profit share dominates 
relative to the wage-reducing effect associated with a higher wage elasticity of labor 
demand. Finally, and importantly, intensified product market competition does not 
necessarily reduce equilibrium unemployment. Intensified product market competition 
will have a direct negative effect on equilibrium unemployment as it induces a lower 
optimal profit share and an indirect positive effect on unemployment as it increases the 
wage mark-up.  Hence a reduced distortion in the product market may not improve the 
performance of the labor market, which suffers from a primary distortion with its roots 
in the bargaining power of the trade union.
14  
In particular, intensified product market competition will hurt employment if the 
product market imperfection is “sufficiently strong” and the relative bargaining power 
                                                                                                                                                 
13   In practice a configuration with α  close to one could capture a situation where the utilization of 
capital would be very low. This might lead to a production function not far from linear with 
respect to labor and thereby increasing the wage elasticity of labor demand. 
  26 
of the trade union is not “high enough”. But when firms commit to optimal profit 
sharing, intensified product market competition will decrease equilibrium 
unemployment in the case of monopoly trade union, while it has no effect on 
equilibrium unemployment when the trade union has no bargaining power. Finally, in 
the absence of profit sharing, intensified competition in the product market will always 
decrease the equilibrium unemployment by decreasing the wage mark-up in the labor 
market. Thus, profit sharing constitutes an essential feature of the mechanism according 
to which intensified product market competition may actually harm employment. In 
this respect our analysis emphasizes the importance of policies directed at reducing 
labor market imperfections under those circumstances where profit sharing is applied 
across the economy.      
  Koskela and Stenbacka (2004b) have investigated the interaction between credit 
and labor market imperfections for equilibrium unemployment in the presence of profit 
sharing.  They demonstrated that intensified credit market competition increases 
equilibrium unemployment if the labor market ‘rigidities’, characterized by high 
relative bargaining power of unions and high benefit-replacement ratios, are sufficiently 
strong and vice versa if ‘rigidities’ are sufficiently weak  (see also Koskela and 
Stenbacka (2004a)). Wasmer and Weil (2004) have investigated a related issue in a 
different framework with job search, labor and credit matching frictions and negotiated 
mark-ups in the labor and credit markets. It would be an important and challenging new 
topic for further research to analyze the interaction between product, labor and credit 
market imperfections and their impacts on equilibrium unemployment  within the 
framework of an integrated model.    
  Within our framework with monopolistic competition the degree of competition 
has been measured by the elasticity of substitution between products. It would be an 
analytical challenge for future research to capture the product market imperfections by 
an oligopoly model. Under such circumstances the returns from the use of profit 
sharing might depend on whether the product market decisions are strategic substitutes 
or complements (for example, quantities or prices). Within such a framework the 
                                                                                                                                                 
14     This argument is analogous to the classical second best analysis by Lipsey and Lancaster (1956-
57), according to which it is not necessarily desirable from a welfare point of view to decrease 
distortions in one particular market if several markets face distortions.  
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relationship the effects of product market competition on equilibrium unemployment 
might also depend on the strategic nature of the competition. 
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APPENDIX A: The Wage Elasticity of Labor Demand 
 
In order to simplify notation we now abstract from the firm-specific index i and define 
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By imposing the symmetry condition  P p =  we get the wage elasticity of labor demand 
expression presented in (11). QED. 
 
 
APPENDIX B: The Indirect Profit Function 
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By further substituting in the optimal price-setting (7) we find that the indirect profit 
function is given by 
). 1 (
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                        QED. 
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APPENDIX C: The Negotiated Base Wage 
This appendix develops the expressions for the terms  *
*
π
π w  and 
U
Uw  in the first-order 
condition (16) determining the Nash bargaining solution. We start by looking at the 
profit response by the firm to a change in the wage rate. The indirect profit function 
was derived in Appendix B. By applying the envelope theorem, according to which the 
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As for the trade union side we find that  [ b w
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Substituting (C1) and C2) into (16) and solving the resulting equation with respect to w 
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APPENDIX D: The Effects of the Benefit-Replacement Ratio on the Relationship 




Figure 7:   Characterization of  ) , ( β s -combinations under which the 
equilibrium unemployment is independent of the intensity of 
product market competition when the benefit-replacement 
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Figure 8:   Characterization of  ) , ( β s -combinations under which the 
equilibrium unemployment is independent of the intensity of 
product market competition when the benefit-replacement 
ratio is   and  5 . 0 = q 9 , 0 = α .  
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